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Abstract This paper investigates the conceptual relationship between open-
ness and reproducibility using a model-centric approach, heavily informed by
probability theory and statistics. We first clarify the concepts of reliability, au-
ditability, replicability, and reproducibility–each of which denotes a potential
scientific objective. Then we advance a conceptual analysis to delineate the
relationship between open scientific practices and these objectives. Using the
notion of an idealized experiment, we identify which components of an experi-
ment need to be reported and which need to be repeated to achieve the relevant
objective. The model-centric framework we propose aims to contribute preci-
sion and clarity to the discussions surrounding the so-called reproducibility
crisis.
Keywords reproducibility · open science · replication · model-centric ·
reliability · confirmation
“I also know this, that, although I might teach only what is true, you must deny
me faith in my words. So in order that I do not perorate, but not leaving with any
faith in all my words, I transfer the authority to anyone who wishes, to come and
show me if what I say concerning the findings of anatomies is really true. For I have
already shown thousands of times the twin [organs] that intercede the spermatic
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cords from the outer horns to the inside of the uterus, be the animal a goat or an
ox or a donkey or a horse, that either wooden sticks round and long, even three or
four times thicker, or the ones called sword-like probes, I have positioned through
the horns. And this must be shown by anyone [that follows the same experimental
method] after I and my pupils have died.” Galen of Pergamon (c.130–210 AD)
1 Introduction
In the last decade, scientists have discussed whether science is facing a repro-
ducibility crisis (Baker, 2016) and numerous explanations have been given for
the proliferation of irreproducible results (Heesen, 2018; Munafo` et al., 2017;
Spellman, 2015). Many of these explanations suggest that irreproducibility is
the consequence of methodological and cultural practices that are erroneous
at individual or system levels. Well-known examples of such questionable re-
search practices include HARKing, p-hacking, and publication bias (Bishop,
2019; Spellman, 2015). HARKing (hypothesizing after results are known) in-
volves presenting a post hoc hypothesis conditional on observing the data as
an a priori hypothesis (Kerr, 1998; Munafo` et al., 2017). P-hacking is a form
of data dredging to find statistically significant results and is a misapplication
of proper statistical methodology (Bruns and Ioannidis, 2016; Munafo` et al.,
2017). Publication bias involves omitting studies with statistically nonsignifi-
cant results from publications and is primarily attributed to flawed incentive
structures in scientific publishing (Munafo` et al., 2017; Collaboration et al.,
2015). The common denominator across these three phenomena is a lack of
transparency (of hypotheses, analyses, and studies, respectively) in research
reporting.
As such, openness is sometimes touted as a remedy to the supposed cri-
sis of irreproducibility (Collins and Tabak, 2014; Iqbal et al., 2016; Nosek
et al., 2015). For example, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,
and Medicine view data sharing as a prerequisite for reproducible results (Na-
tional Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2017). A number of
tools are becoming increasingly available to make numerous aspects of science
open (Ioannidis, 2014; Munafo` et al., 2017; Nosek et al., 2015, 2018). As the
thinking goes, the building blocks of a reproducible science are replication
studies (Earp and Trafimow, 2015; LeBel and Peters, 2011; Schmidt, 2009),
and transparency makes replication studies possible by making research ma-
terials and processes explicit and accessible. The link between transparency,
replication studies, and reproducibility is not straightforward, however. For
example, results can be reproduced from experiments that are not completely
transparent (say, because the same materials in question are not accessible,
or methods are unknown) and reproducibility can be difficult to achieve, even
when experiments are completely transparent and exact replication studies
can be conducted.
We are not convinced by the picture that openness, which would correct
questionable research practices, is the straightforward solution to the pur-
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ported reproducibility crisis. Even if openness were the solution, it is not clear
to us why it would be. Our problem is an intellectual one: if we lack a clear
understanding of the relationship between transparency, replications, and re-
producibility, it is not clear how or why openness is supposed to help. Before
calling foul on scientists or scientific practice, it behooves us to better un-
derstand these relationships and set our expectations right for a reproducible
science. That is the aim of this paper.
To set the stage, we first present a toy example and derive a number of
relatively benign observations and conclusions regarding replications and re-
producibility, drawing from probability theory and well-known facts in statis-
tics (Section 2). This motivates our conceptualization of an idealized experi-
ment and definitions of reliability, auditability, replicability, and reproducibil-
ity (Section 3). We are then in a position to present our analysis of openness,
which comes in two parts. The first part emphasizes the epistemic aspect of re-
producibility, which illuminates a historical debate between Newton, Goethe,
and others (Section 4). The second part provides a more detailed account of
the components of an experiment that need to be shared (or don’t) given some
objective (Section 5).
Our analysis makes little to no mention of hypotheses. This is not an
oversight. Our analysis is situated in what we call a model-centric view of
science. From this perspective, scientific progress is made when old models
are replaced by new ones and experiments are performed in order to compare
models. The idea that scientific meaning is carried by models or that models
play a central role otherwise is not novel and has been discussed both in
scientific and philosophical literature (Glass and Hall, 2008; Taper and Lele,
2011; Weisberg, 2012). This approach is distinct from a hypothesis-centric
approach and we contrast these two in the discussion section (Section 6).
2 Stage setting: A toy example and initial observations
Consider a large population of ravens where each raven is either black or white.
Our goal is to estimate the true proportion of black ravens in the population,
denoted by pi, given a random sample of ravens from this population. We
assume that there is no classification or measurement error. That is, each
observed raven can be identified correctly as black or white. We also assume
that the population is well-mixed and observations are independent, each with
probability of being black equal to the true proportion of black ravens in the
population.
This initial setup is generalizable and quite mundane from a statistical
perspective. We could have considered any phenomenon that can be observed
repeatedly, where a decision has to be made under uncertainty using obser-
vations. The probability calculus quantifies uncertainty, and statistical meth-
ods based on probabilistic models provide the machinery to perform inference
about aspects of the mechanism generating these observations. Examples of
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these aspects include estimating a parameter or predicting future observations
under an assumed probability model, or selecting between competing proba-
bility models.
With this in mind, we now consider the following two experiments that
could be conducted within the paradigm of our toy example.
Experiment 1. A simple random sample of n ravens is collected. We
observe b black ravens in the sample. The likelihood of the observed data
conditional on pi and n is given by the binomial probability model, and is
equal to
P(b|pi, n) =
(
n
b
)
pib(1− pi)n−b. (1)
Experiment 2. A simple random sample of ravens is collected until w
white ravens are observed. We observe b black ravens such that b+w = n.
The likelihood of the observed data conditional on pi and w is given by the
negative binomial probability model, and is equal to
P(b|pi,w) =
(
n− 1
w − 1
)
pib(1− pi)w. (2)
This setup is not novel – it could be found in a standard statistics text.
Nevertheless, several observations about the setup are important to make ex-
plicit, as they provide us with conclusions that help guide our thinking about
reproducibility and openness.
Observation 1: The probability models in Equations (1) and (2) are dif-
ferent because the parameter vectors (pi, n) and (pi,w) are different in these
two models. Yet the population proportion of black ravens pi is a param-
eter of both models and therefore can be estimated. Assume we estimate
the proportion of black ravens by the well-known statistical method of
the maximum likelihood (ML). The ML estimate pˆiML is the proportion
of black ravens that maximizes the likelihood of the observed data. The
estimates for pi under model (1) and model (2) are both equal to b/n.
Conclusion 1: Some results of Experiment 1 can be reproduced by Ex-
periment 2 even if the models in these experiments are different. In other
words, the model in Experiment 2 is not required to be the identical model
as in the Experiment 1 to reproduce some of its results.
Observation 2: Conclusion 1 cannot solely be explained by the use of the
identical method in both experiments because ML is applied on realizations
of different random variables in two models. To see this, note that the
maximum number of black ravens that can be observed in Experiment 1
is n but in Experiment 2 it is the maximum number of black ravens in the
population. If we use pˆiML in Experiment 1 and pˆiMM in Experiment 2,
where MM denotes the method of moments estimator, the estimates are
still both equal to b/n, even though MM is based on a different principle
than ML.
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Conclusion 2: The method in Experiment 2 is not required to be the
identical method as in Experiment 1 to reproduce some of its results.
Observation 3: The stopping rule of data collection in Experiment 1
is different than the stopping rule in Experiment 2. Experiment 1 stops
when n ravens are observed. Experiment 2 stops when w white ravens are
observed. Thus, the data structures in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 are
different.
Conclusion 3: The data structure in Experiment 2 is not required to be
identical to the data structure in Experiment 1 to reproduce some of its
results.
Observation 4: To assess whether the estimate b/n obtained in Experi-
ment 1 is reproduced in Experiment 2, Experiment 2 must know the result
of Experiment 1.
Conclusion 4: Experiment 2 needs sufficient background information about
results of Experiment 1 to assess whether the results are reproduced. Thus,
the background information used in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 must
be different from each other.
Observation 5: Assume we repeat Experiment 1 a large number of times
and we choose the estimator of pi as:
pˆi =
b
n
+ I{1st raven is black},
where I{A} = 1 if A, and else zero. This estimator is equal to its true value
pi in 100(1− pi)% on average and equal to 2pi in 100pi% of the experiments
on average.
Conclusion 5: True results are not always reproducible. For example, if
the true population of black ravens is 0.8 and our experiments return a
smattering of values close to the truth but only one that is exactly 0.8,
then only one result is true. Note that “true” here involves the idea of
accuracy because the estimates are real numbers. Providing a range of
values instead would sacrifice accuracy to ensure truth: in the extreme, if
we say that the proportion of black ravens is between 0 and 1, we guarantee
a true claim, but it is not informative. For ease of exposition, we continue
to use “true” with the precision provided by real numbers and handle the
idea of closeness in other ways.
Observation 6: Assume we repeat Experiment 1 a large number of times
and we choose the estimator of pi as:
pˆi =
1
2
.
There is no statistical reason for this estimator to be equal to its true value
pi since it is not using the observations as a representative sample from the
population. However, we will always return the same value if we fix the
sample size.
Conclusion 6: Perfectly reproducible results may not be true. Hence re-
producibility is not sufficient for truth.
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A few remarks regarding the simplicity of our toy example. Observation
5 presents a biased estimator that only sometimes equals the true parame-
ter value. While this may or may not be a realistic choice of an estimator,
our point in this observation is that the observed rate of reproducibility is
a function of the methods that we apply on data to make inference and the
true rate of reproducibility. Theoretically speaking, we cannot always expect
true results to be reproducible. Similarly, sampling error and model misspec-
ification (Box, 1976; Dennis et al., 2019) present other potential reasons for
why true results may not always be reproducible. Observation 6, on the other
hand, is in tension with actual scientific practice, which uses observations as
a way for models to make “contact” with the world. Though contrived, this
conclusion, as well as the others, carry over to relevant aspects of real science.
For example, the estimator in observation 6 could be a complicated algorithm
with an unintentional “error” in the code implementation could have the same
effect. It is thus possible that two separate labs using the same code reproduce
one another’s results, not because they are accessing the truth, but because
the same error is biasing the process to provide the same result. Of course
code verification and validation processes will help minimize the instantiation
of such possibilities. This acknowledges the point. Reproducibility may occur
because of aspects of experiments or analyses and not “nature” (or whatever
scientists are trying to make contact with)1.
In brief, it is possible to reproduce the results of an experiment in a variety
of ways, even in experiments that are not carbon copies of the original exper-
iment. In order to provide a more detailed analysis of what does and doesn’t
need to be copied, and relatedly made open, we first provide some additional
clarification of the idea of an experiment and define some key terms.
3 Concepts and Terminology
We start with the notion of idealized experiment, which is central to many
forms of scientific inquiry (Devezer et al., 2018). Given some background
knowledge K on a natural phenomenon, a scientific theory makes a prediction,
which is in principle testable using observables, the data D. A mechanism gen-
erating D is formulated under uncertainty. This mechanism is represented as
a probability model Mθ parametrized by θ. The extent to which, parts of Mθ
are relevant to the prediction are confirmed by D is assessed by a fixed and
known collection of methods S evaluated at D. We denote (Mθ, D, S,K) by
ξ, an idealized experiment2.
We further refine two components of ξ. First, we let D ≡ {Dv, Ds} where
Dv denotes the observed values, and Ds denotes the structural aspects of
1 Ian Hacking has referred to this phenomenon as “the self-vindication of the laboratory
sciences” (Hacking, 1992).
2 Our conceptualization of the idealized experiment follows a parallel to Hacking (1992)’s
taxonomy of laboratory experiments. Our K and Mθ would be subsumed under his ideas,
S under things, and D under marks.
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Assumptions common to all experiments: 
@ A simple random sample is drawn from a 
large population, where each raven is either 
black or white with constant probability 
@ The population proportion of black ravens is 
a quantity of interest
R1
Experiment
Assumption: 
@ Given a random sample of n=3 ravens
R1*
Mθ (Binomial)
Spost
2 1 Dv
Ds
# #+
n
D
2/3
Spost(D*)
Replication
Experiment 1
Assumption: 
@ Given a random sample of n=3 ravens
R1(r)
Mθ (Binomial)
Spost
1 2 Dv
Ds
# #+
n
D
1/3
Spost(D(r))
Replication
Experiment 2
Assumption: 
@ Given a sample of ravens until w=1
R1(r)
Mθ (Negative Binomial)
Spost
1 1 Dv
Ds
# #+
n
D
1/2
Spost(D(r))
Fig. 1 Elements of three idealized experiments: experiment, replication experiment 1, and
an alternative replication experiment 2.
the data, such as the sample size, number of variables, units of measurement
for each variable, and metadata. Second, we let S ≡ {Spre, Spost} where Spre
denotes the procedures, instruments, experimental design, and tools used prior
to and necessary for obtaining Dv, and Spost denotes the analytical tools and
procedures applied to D once it is obtained. We define Ri as a result which is
obtained by applying Spost to D. We denote the set of all results obtainable
from an experiment as R ≡ {R1, R2, R3, · · · }. Figure 1 shows these elements
in the context of our toy example of Section 2.
Using this notion of an idealized experiment, we adopt the following defi-
nitions. We will clarify why in some cases we define a term differently from in
relevant literature.
Reliability : Propensity of a method S to produce consistent results given
the same inputs or initial conditions. Conditional on the same observation
in the sample space, Mθ, and K, a method Spre is reliable if it consistently
produces D. A method Spost is reliable if applying Spost to D consistently
yields R. For the rest of this manuscript, we make the simplifying assump-
tion that S is sufficiently reliable.
Auditability : The accessibility of all necessary information regarding the
components of ξ so that Spost can be applied to D to obtain R indepen-
dently of ξ. Auditing is a procedure of screening for certain errors, including
human and instrumental, that may be introduced in the process of obtain-
ing R. Examples are data entry and programming errors. If Spost is not
reliable, auditability of ξ will not be affected but the auditing process will
also be less reliable because it may not consistently yield R.
Replicability : An experiment ξ is replicable if information about the neces-
sary components of ξ to obtain some Ri is available and if these components
can be duplicated, copied, or matched in an independent experiment ξ′. A
replication experiment ξ′, generates D′ independent from D, conditional
on the true data generating mechanism. We use Ri instead of R in this
definition because ξ′ might only be interested in a subset of the results
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of ξ. A common interpretation of ξ′ would be (Mθ, D′, S,K), where the
replication experiment differs from ξ only in data values D′v while dupli-
cating all other components of ξ. Our analysis in section 5 diverges from
this view of replication studies and brings a more fine-tuned understanding
of which components of an experiment need to be duplicated or matched
for replicability.
Reproducibility : The rate of Ri being reproduced. We say that Ri is re-
produced by R′i if Mθ and M
′
θ are confirmed or disconfirmed in the same
direction in a probabilistic confirmation sense, such that Ri and R
′
i are
deemed equivalent. For example, if Ri is an estimate of parameter θ, then
D confirms θ if the probability of θ after observing the data, P(θ|Mθ, D,K),
is greater than the probability of θ before observing the data, P(pi|Mθ,K).
Here, R′i reproduces Ri if P(θ|M ′θ, D′,K ′) > P(θ|M ′θ,K ′). In order to re-
produce Ri for the right reasons, S must be sufficiently reliable.
Notice that our definition of reproducibility focuses on the end products
of experiments, the results, and not the other components of experiments
that bring those products about. This choice is fitting given the etymology of
the term “reproduce”. Our choice for our definition of replicability similarly
respects its etymology—it incorporates the notion to repeat something, in our
case it is the components of an experiment. While our use of these terms is
consistent with, if more refined than, other work (Leonelli, 2018; Radder, 1992,
1996; Collaboration et al., 2015), there is considerable variation in how these
terms are used in the scientific literature (Fidler and Wilcox, 2018; Penders
et al., 2019; Stodden, 2011). We aim to sidestep potential confusion by laying
out the definitions as we have and adhering to them for the remainder of this
paper.
From our definitions, we conclude that auditability is not necessary for
replicability or reproducibility. For example, to audit Ri, we need to examine
D and implement Spost on D. To replicate ξ or to reproduce Ri, on the other
hand, we do not need to know D. Moreover, auditability is not sufficient for
reproducibility either. A replication experiment ξ′ includes new data D′ that
is generated by the true data generating mechanism. Even if ξ is auditable, Ri
may not be reproduced by R′i—an example of which was shown in Observation
5 in Section 2.
Our definition of auditability closely tracks the idea of openness in science.
However, whereas we have just stated that audibility is not necessary for re-
producibility, the science reform movement, as described in the introduction,
leads us to believe that openness is necessary for reproducibility. The tension
we have built between auditability, openness, and reproducibility provides an
opportunity to clarify their relationship. Doing so will ultimately lead us to
a better understanding of reproducibility and the putative crisis. In the next
section we work through a thought experiment to illustrate an important epis-
temic aspect of reproducibility that helps us enrich the concept of openness.
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4 Open Science as a Logical Necessity to Epistemic Reproducibility
We expand our toy example of ravens with a thought experiment, “the repro-
ducibility collaboratorium” to distinguish between two types of reproducibil-
ity: in-principle and epistemic. We argue that open science, which makes the
necessary components3 of an experiment available for use by others, is a logical
necessity for epistemic reproducibility of research results.
We consider two collaboratoriums, a closed collaboratorium and an open
collaboratorium and imagine the following scenario common to both collab-
oratoriums: Each collaboratorium consists of Lab 1 and Lab 2 that conduct
Experiment 1 and Experiment 1′, respectively. Experiment 1′ is conducted af-
ter Experiment 1, and ravens are sampled from one large population. All four
labs assume identical models and data structure, and employ identical meth-
ods with the goal of estimating the population proportion of black ravens
using their observations. Further, we assume that the number of black ravens
observed in all four labs is the same.
In the closed collaboratorium, Lab 1 and Lab 2 are isolated from each
other and there is no information flow from Lab 1 to Lab 2. Crucially, because
of this lack of information flow, Experiment 1′ will match all the elements of
Experiment 1 that are relevant to estimating the proportion of black ravens
in the population by chance. Such a match is improbable since there are many
reasonable ways of conducting an experiment. Nevertheless, since Experiment
1 and Experiment 1′ use identical models and methods and observed the same
number of black ravens in the sample, they return the same estimate of the
population proportion of black ravens. However, Experiment 1′ does not have
any information pertaining to the results of Experiment 1, and thus Lab 2
is in a position neither to learn from the results of Experiment 1, nor to
claim that it reproduced the result of Experiment 1. If an external observer
were to observe the experiments conducted in both labs, they could first learn
from the result of Experiment 1. Starting with an updated view about the
proportion of black ravens provided by the result of Experiment 1, they could
then use the number of ravens observed in Experiment 1′ to conclude that the
result of Experiment 1 is indeed reproduced by Experiment 1′. When there
is no information exchange between the labs, however, there is no meaningful
epistemic interaction between Experiment 1 and Experiment 1′.
This closed collaboratorium example highlights two important points: (1) If
there is no open science in the sense of information flow from one experiment
(or lab) to the next, it is improbable (but still possible) for a replication
experiment to take place, and (2) the result of Experiment 1 can be said to be
reproduced by Experiment 1′ only if the result of Experiment 1 is available to
Experiment 1′. In order to acknowledge these points, we say that a result can
only be in-principle reproducible if there is no epistemic exchange between
the labs which would accumulate evidence, with the exception of via some
omniscient external observer.
3 We further explain what we mean by “necessary components” in Section 5.
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C lo s e d  C o l la b o r a t o r iu m  a n d  
In  P r in c ip le  R e p ro d u c ib i l i t y
Experiment 1
and
Data in 
favor of black
ravens is 1/1
 
View on proportion of 
black ravens 
before observing 
the data is 1/2
View on proportion
of black ravens 
after observing 
the data is 3/4
gets
Experiment 1'
and
Data in 
favor of black
ravens is 1/1
 
View on proportion of 
black ravens 
before observing 
the data is 1/2
View on proportion
of black ravens 
after observing 
the data is 3/4
gets
External Observer
Data in 
favor of black
ravens is 1/1
 
View on proportion of 
black ravens 
before observing 
the data is 1/2
View on proportion
of black ravens 
after observing 
the data is 3/4
and gets
O p e n  C o l la b o r a t o r iu m  a n d  
E p is t e m ic  R e p ro d u c ib i l i t y
Experiment 1
and
Data in 
favor of black
ravens is 1/1
 
View on proportion of 
black ravens 
before observing 
the data is 1/2
View on proportion
of black ravens 
after observing 
the data is 3/4
gets
Information from 
Experiment 1 
to 
Replication Experiment
Replication Experiment
Data in 
favor of black
ravens is 1/1
 
View on proportion of 
black ravens 
before observing 
the data is 1/2
View on proportion
of black ravens 
after observing 
the data is 3/4
and gets
Possible but vanishingly improbable:
Without any knowledge of Experiment 1,
Experiment 1' replicated and
"in principle" reproduced the results of Experiment 1
Information from Experiment 1
to
External Observer
Information from Experiment 1'
to
External Observer
Fig. 2 Closed collaboratorium: Experiment 1 starts with prior view of 1/2 on proportion of
black ravens. Observes 2 black ravens and updates their view to 3/4. Identical view, model,
and methods are assumed and the same data values are observed in Experiment 1′, but in
the absence of an external observer the two results cannot be connected, thus reproducibility
is only in principle and evidence does not accumulate in the absence of an external observer
privy to both experiments. Open collaboratorium: Experiment 1 starts with prior view
of 1/2 on proportion of black ravens. Observes 2 black ravens and updates their view to
3/4. Experiment 1′–a replication experiment–is informed of the result, model, methods and
observes the same data values. Starting with a view of 3/4 they update the proportion of
black ravens to 5/6. Thus, Experiment 1′ learns from Experiment 1 in a planned manner.
The two results can be connected and thus reproducibility is epistemic.
In the open collaboratorium we assume that Experiment 1 has a view on
the population proportion of black ravens prior to observing ravens. By con-
trast to the closed version, however, in the open collaboratorium Lab 1 reports
all information relevant to estimating the proportion of black ravens to Lab 2,
which incorporates this information to conduct Experiment 1′. Thus Exper-
iment 1′ matches the elements of Experiment 1 by a kind of social learning.
We assume this information is transmitted in the background knowledge of
the experiment. Starting with an updated view about the proportion of black
ravens in the population and conditional on the number of black ravens ob-
served, Lab 2 could conclude that they have indeed reproduced the result of
Experiment 1. Thus in the open collaboratorium there is an epistemic interac-
tion between the two experiments which contributes to the progress of science
through accumulation of evidence. In contrast to the closed collaboratorium,
in the open collaboratorium replication experiments are not contingent on
chance but can be routinely performed via social learning, which gives us the
notion of epistemic reproducibility. We illustrate the two collaboratoriums in
Figure 2.
The distinction between in-principle and epistemic reproducibility is rel-
evant to understanding debates about reproducibility. Consider a historical
example. Isaac Newton (1643–1727 AD) believed his experimentum crucis did
not need to be replicated because it already presented conclusive proof of his
theory. When Anthony Lucas (1633–1693 AD) failed to reproduce and even
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negated Newton’s results in his replication experiments, Newton was angry:
[it was not] “the number of experiments, but weight to be regarded; and where
one will do, what need many?” (Newton, 1676). When faced with further crit-
icism from his opponents, Newton refused to discuss Lucas’s (unsuccessful)
replications and invited Lucas to talk about his original experimentum crucis
instead (Westfall and Devons, 1981, p. 275).
Newton’s anti-replication attitude was heavily criticized by Johann Wolf-
gang von Goethe (1749–1832 AD) who believed that single experiments or
even several of them would not be enough to prove any theory, and that it
was a major task of scientists to design and conduct a series of contiguous
experiments, each derived from the preceding one (Ribe, 1985). Goethe’s in-
sistence on replication experiments echoes a long and far ranging history of
advocates. Any coverage of this history here would be superficial and take us
too far afield. Suffice it to say that this history is on the side of Goethe.
How can we make sense of Netwon’s anti-replication attitude against a
large backdrop of advocates represented by Goethe? If Newton’s dismissive
attitude towards replication is framed by in-principle reproducibility, we can
understand why the replication of experiments is unnecessary. Newton must
have already believed that his results were in-principle reproducible because
of the underlying theory, hence, he did not deem any direct replication ex-
periments necessary. This view would be consistent with his famous quote
“hypotheses non fingo” (I feign no hypotheses) since he did not see his exper-
imentum crucis so much as testing a scientific hypothesis as demonstrating
an already proven theory. This view, however, is not widely shared by scien-
tists conducting experiments under uncertainty today. For most of empirical
science today, scientists must exchange information and replicate each others’
experiments in order to increase their confidence that new knowledge has been
added (or, that they know that they have discovered some new fact) by way
of reproducing results. It seems that Goethe and others were concerned with
epistemic rather than in-principle reproducibility.
With epistemic reproducibility defined, we can take a closer look at the
components (Mθ, D, S,K) defining ξ and investigate what, more specifically,
needs to be open for epistemic reproducibility. We turn to this topic in the
next section.
5 Which components of an experiment need to be open for
epistemic reproducibility?
In recent years several tools have been developed to help facilitate openness
in science (Collins and Tabak, 2014; Munafo` et al., 2017; Nosek et al., 2015;
Wagenmakers et al., 2012). In some cases the net is cast broadly, making as
much information available as possible. In other cases intuition guides which
components are relevant and need to be shared in the replication of an ex-
periment. We are interested in using our model-centric framework to better
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understand what does and does not need to be made available and under what
conditions.
The context of epistemic reproducibility is our starting point. In addition,
our analysis will take into account our toy example and initial observations, as
well as our thought experiment about collaboratoriums. Moreover, our anal-
ysis will be structured by our concept of an idealized experiment. That is,
we confine ourselves to identify the components of experiments as we have
conceived of them, leaving open the possibility that there are other ways of
describing scientific processes relevant to replication and reproducibility.
For our analysis, we can understand an experiment ξ given by (Mθ, D, S,K)
as a function that takes D generated from the true data generating model
as a random input and produces a result R as a random output. Thus, ξ
is a random transformation from the space of data to the space of results
under the assumptions specified by Mθ (the model), S (the methods), and K
(background knowledge). Assuming that a model in an experiment captures
the true data generating mechanism, we can investigate which components of
the model, the method, and the data are needed to be transmitted to reproduce
the results of an experiment in a replication experiment ξ′. We encapsulate
the transmission of these components from ξ to ξ′ in K ′. By definition, this
makes K and K ′ different, a version of an observation we already made in
sections 2 and 3.
Our results are grouped by components: i) (model) specific aspects of the
model might have to be shared, but whether it does and which parts of a model
depends on the objective; ii) (method) we specifically identify those aspects
of S′post that need to be shared; iii) (data) here we distinguish between the
structural aspects of data and the observed values, and what has to be open
depends on whether we are doing an exact replication or a reproducibility
experiment.
5.1 What parts of model Mθ are needed for reproducibility?
Statistical theory shows us that for ξ′ to be able to reproduce all possible results
of ξ, the specification of model Mθ up to the unknown quantities needs to be
transmitted to the replication experiment, such that Mθ and M
′
θ are identical
models. If an aspect of Mθ that has an inferential value is not transmitted
to ξ′, that inferential value is lost, and the results relevant to that inferential
value cannot be reproduced.
On the other hand, given an inferential objective to produce a specific re-
sult Ri, the aspects of Mθ that are irrelevant to that objective need not be
transmitted to the replication experiment. This point is shown by Observa-
tion 1 and Conclusion 1 of our toy example in Section 2. When we consider
estimating the population proportion of black ravens, the two models in our ex-
ample are different from each other but have an identical parameter capturing
the population proportion of black ravens and they both employ the number
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of black ravens observed in the sample in the same way for that particular
objective.
If Mθ is not identical to M
′
θ, then ξ and ξ
′ differ from each other with
respect to the assumed data generating mechanism. What matters is whether
these aspects affect the results of S applied on D for estimating the population
proportion of black ravens. That is, even though the model in a replication
experiment differs from the original, what matters is that the models share
the relevant parameters, in this case the proportion of black ravens.
We can demonstrate this formally. Equation (1) and (2) give the likelihood
of observing b black ravens in a sample of size n under the binomial and
negative binomial probability models respectively and the maximum likelihood
estimate for the population proportion of black ravens under both models is
b/n. The reason for this is that binomial and negative binomial models are in
the same likelihood equivalence class with respect to the objective of estimating
the population proportion of black ravens: The maximum likelihood estimator
can be derived by setting the expression resulting from taking the derivative
of the logarithm of the likelihood function with respect to pi and solving for
pi. For Equation (1) we get
d
dpi
[logP(b|pi, n)] = d
dpi
[
log
(
n
b
)]
+
d
dpi
[b log pi] +
d
dpi
[w log(1− pi)], (3)
and for Equation (2) we get
d
dpi
[logP(b|pi, n)] = d
dpi
[
log
(
n− 1
w − 1
)]
+
d
dpi
[b log pi] +
d
dpi
[w log(1− pi)]. (4)
The difference between these two equations is only in the first terms which are
equal to zero. We get pˆi = b/n as the unique solution in both models.
The first term in Equation (1) and Equation (2) determines the stopping
rule of the experiments. In ξ, we stop the experiment when n ravens are ob-
served and the last raven can be black or white. In ξ′ we stop the experiment
when w white ravens are observed and the last observation must be a white
raven. This difference between stopping rules means that: 1) Spre is different
from S′pre. 2) Under our choice of Spost as the maximum likelihood estimator
the stopping rules in two models are irrelevant for estimating the proportion
of black ravens in the population.
We also need to distinguish between openness (and auditability) of Mθ
from replicability of Mθ. In our binomial and negative binomial models, M
′
θ is
different from Mθ. However, these two models are compatible with respect to
a certain inferential objective that allows for reproducing a specific Ri, which
is estimating the proportion of black ravens in the population. To establish
this compatibility, Mθ should be open to ξ
′ but does not need to be replicable
or replicated. Specifically, to choose a negative binomial probability model in
ξ′ to reproduce the estimate of the proportion of black ravens in the popula-
tion obtained in ξ, we need to know that ξ has used a binomial probability
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model, which ensures that ξ′ will use a probability model that has the same
parameter—proportion of black ravens, with the exact same meaning in ξ.
Without Mθ, this compatibility cannot be established.
This point is clearly illustrated in a recent article (Silberzahn et al., 2018)
in which the same data D was independently analyzed by twenty-nine research
teams who were provided data and a research question that puts a restriction
on which Ris would be relevant for the purposes of the project. The teams were
not, however, provided a Mθ, Spost, or K. Teams ended up using a variety of
models differing in their assumptions about the error variance and the number
of covariates to analyze the same data set. The results differed widely with
regard to reported effect sizes and hypothesis tests. So even when D was open,
the lack of specification with regard to Mθ yielded largely inconsistent results.
Taking stock, our ravens example is deliberately simple to help in our anal-
ysis. State of the art models are often complex objects. If the assumed model
and its assumptions are complex, it might not always be clear which class of
models contains others, and a matching model for ξ may not even be available.
Then, Mθ needs to be both auditable and replicable for reproducibility. This
result is particularly important to communicate to scientists who primarily
engage in routine null hypothesis significant testing procedures and may not
be conventionally expected to transparently report their models.
5.2 What parts of a method are needed for reproducibility?
In this section, we focus on Spost (the analytical methods applied to data) but
leave Spre (experimental procedures to generate data) unspecified. Studying
Spre is complicated because for a given model Mθ, the number of ways that
an experiment can be designed is not well specified under statistical theory,
and procedures and measurements to test the same research question can vary.
Even in our simple ravens example, a raven can be observed for its color by an
investigator using their eyes, but a blind investigator may opt for a mechanical
pigment test. This experimental design issue is sometimes referred to as “hid-
den moderators” when explaining why results of replication experiments differ
from original experiments (Baribault et al., 2018). In addition, the issues sur-
rounding measurement error has been studied extensively and measurement
error might be a potential factor exacerbating irreproducibility (Loken and
Gelman, 2017; Stanley and Spence, 2014). What we can say is that, at mini-
mum, auditability of Spre appears to be essential for reproducibility. Once all
experimental procedures, design details, and instruments are reported, their
exact replicability becomes less of an issue for ξ′ to the degree that measure-
ment error can be explicitly modeled in case of any deviation from Spre.
Turning our attention to analytical methods applied to data, Observation
3 and Conclusion 3 in Section 2 show that Spost and S
′
post do not have to be
identical. Some statistical methods are mathematically equivalent even though
their motivations are different. For example, the maximum likelihood estima-
Openness and Reproducibility: Insights from a Model-Centric Approach 15
tor and the method of moments estimator are equivalent in estimating the
population proportion of black ravens in our toy example. We can demon-
strate this formally. Consider the binomial model specified by Equation (1). If
Spost is the maximum likelihood estimator motivated by the likelihood princi-
ple, the standard procedure to obtain it is to take the likelihood represented
by Equation (3), setting the right hand side to zero, taking the derivative, and
finally solving for pi :
d
dpi
[
log
(
n
b
)]
+
d
dpi
[b log pi] +
d
dpi
[w log(1− pi)] = 0,
b/pi − w/(1− pi) = 0,
so we have
pˆiML = b/(b+ w)⇒ pˆiML = b/n.
On the other hand, if Spost is the method of moments estimator, the motivation
is to set the population mean equal to the sample mean and solve for pi. The
population mean in a binomial model with sample size n and the probability
of observing a black raven pi is npi and the sample mean is the number of black
ravens in the sample b. So the method of moments estimator is
npˆiMM = b ⇒ pˆiMM = b/n,
equivalent to pˆiML.
Furthermore, other methods are mathematically equivalent even though
their very interpretation of probability differs. For example, maximum likeli-
hood estimates and the posterior mode in Bayesian inference under uniform
prior distribution of parameters are equivalent regardless of the true data gen-
erating model. Conversely, there are also methods designed for a specific goal
but that do not produce identical R when applied to the same D. For example,
Devezer et al. (2018) shows that the choice between the Akaike’s Information
Criterion and Schwarz criterion might influence the reproducibility of results
in a model comparison.
In addition, a statistical method used to draw inferences about is often
conditional on a fully specified statistical model up to a finite number of un-
known parameters of that model. Consider the following situation. A scientist
who designs ξ′ is given only the following information about ξ : “A population
has only black and white ravens, and ravens are sampled to perform infer-
ence about the error on the population proportion of black ravens.” This is
an underspecified model that might easily lead to different methods of choice
for Spost and S
′
post—the estimator of the error of population proportion of
black ravens. The scientist might assume a large population and sample the
ravens with replacement to build a binomial probability model for the data
generating process. On the other hand, she might also assume a small popu-
lation and sample the ravens without replacement to build a hypergeometric
probability model. The error about these estimates are different even though
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Spost and S
′
post might be motivated by one principle, such as maximum like-
lihood. Further, these differences are likely to be exacerbated if the methods
are motivated by different principles.
From these examples, we infer that S′post either needs to be identical to
Spost or should match it with regard to desired inference (point estimation,
interval estimation, hypothesis testing, prediction, model selection) and in a
way to allow for reproducing a specific Ri. To match, Spost should be open or
auditable to ξ′ but does not need to be replicable or replicated. In order to use
the method of moments estimator to estimate the proportion of black ravens
in a replication experiment, we need to know that ξ has used a maximum
likelihood estimator. This way, it can be ensured that ξ′ will either use the
same estimator as ξ or will match it.
5.3 What parts of data are needed for reproducibility?
In section 3 we defined D ≡ {Dv, Ds} where Dv denotes the observed values,
and Ds denotes the structural aspects of the data, such as the sample size,
number of variables, units of measurement for each variable, and metadata.
If D ≡ {Dv, Ds} and D′ ≡ {D′v, D′s} are the data obtained in an experi-
ment and a replication experiment respectively, D′ is often thought of as the
new data of the old kind in the sense that the values D′v are independent from
the values Dv, but that the data structures Ds and D
′
s are identical. Obser-
vation 4 and Conclusion 4 of our toy example consists of a counterexample to
this case where the Ds and D
′
s can be different and the result Ri is still re-
produced by R′i, if these differences do not affect how the method S evaluates
D and D′ for the inferential objective.
While Ds does not need to be exactly duplicated in ξ
′ for reproducibility
of Ri, the parts of it relevant to obtaining Ri need to be open. Consider a
situation where some ravens cannot be classified as black or white (perhaps
due to Spre not being sufficiently sensitive) and are recorded as missing data.
In this case the number of missing data points is carried in Ds. If the estimate
of population proportion of black ravens is reported as b/n, without Ds, ξ
′
would not know whether the number of missing data points are treated as
part of n or left out. Therefore, ξ′ cannot ensure whether they reproduced
Ri. From this example, we infer that D
′
s either needs to be identical to Ds
or should match it with regard to desired inference and in a way to allow for
reproducing a specific Ri. For similar reasons, Ds also needs to be open for
the purposes of auditability of R.
Data sharing is often viewed as a prerequisite for a reproducible science (Na-
tional Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2017; Hardwicke
et al., 2018; Molloy, 2011; Stodden, 2011). Our analysis suggests this is poten-
tially misconceived. Using the components of the idealized experiment and sta-
tistical theory, we have shown that to reproduce a resultRi of ξ := (Mθ, D, S,K),
one needs to know aspects of Mθ, Ds, and S relevant to obtaining Ri. More-
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over, a replication experiment ξ′ need not copy these aspects of Mθ, Ds, and S
to reproduce Ri. We also show that having open access to Dv has no bearing
on designing and performing a replication experiment ξ′ or reproducibility of
Ri. ξ
′ aims to reproduce the result, not the data. That said, openness of Dv is
necessary for auditability of ξ. Auditability, replicability, and reproducibility
are distinct concepts and they need to be assessed separately when evaluat-
ing individual experiments. While some level of open scientific practices is
necessary to obtain reproducible results, we argue that open data are not a
prerequisite.
There might be other benefits to open data, from auditability of results
to enabling further research on the same data; however, the distinction we
draw matters particularly in situations where there may be arguably valid
concerns, such as ethics regarding data sharing (Borgman, 2012). We recom-
mend that open data be evaluated on its own merits which has been discussed
extensively (Janssen et al., 2012) but not as a precursor of reproducibility.
6 Discussion
Open practices in scientific inquiry have long been intuitively proposed as a key
to solve the issues surrounding reproducibility of scientific results. However, a
formal framework to validate this intuition has been missing and is needed for a
clearer discussion of reproducibility. We have contributed to such a theoretical
framework here. We finish with some discussion about how we see our project
situated in the landscape of theories of science.
Within the last century, an important approach that has been taken to-
wards understanding reproducibility was motivated by the work of Karl Pop-
per, particularly The Logic of Scientific Discovery and the notion of falsifia-
bility. Popper (1959) states that “non-reproducible single occurrences are of
no significance to science” (p. 86) and they would not be useful in refuting
theories. Here Popper appears to rely on some notion of reproducibility to
establish his falsifiability criterion of science. At the very least, Popper would
agree that in order to refute a theory or [scientific] hypothesis, the experi-
mental result must indeed be a falsifying counterexample. There is, however,
a tension between Popper’s emphasis on falsifiability and his skepticism to-
wards confirmation. To generate confidence that a counterexample is genuine
and not an error or one-off case is to ensure that the result is reproducible.
To do this, the original experiment should be replicated. The problem here is
that this process of replication and reproducibility is a kind of confirmation,
one that establishes or increases confidence that a counterexample is genuine.
Only once we establish that we have a genuine counterexample can we then
proceed in Popperian-style towards the falsification of the hypothesis or theory
in question.
Popper’s falsifiability view has had considerable impact on 20th century
science and reproducibility has implicitly been accepted as part of scien-
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tific activity. Furthermore, Popper’s view on falsifiability motivates what we
call the hypothesis-centric approach to understanding reproducibility. On this
approach, an experiment is performed in order to disconfirm a hypothesis,
and thereby falsify a theory (Glass and Hall, 2008). One example of taking
the hypothesis-centric approach in the contemporary literature about repro-
ducibility is McElreath and Smaldino (2015).
There is an alternative. Whereas Popper places a great deal of emphasis
on the concepts of theories and hypotheses, much of current science, partic-
ularly given the rise of Bayesianism, focuses instead on models and model
comparison (Burnham and Anderson, 2003). Since the exponential increase in
computing power it has become possible to perform the necessary computa-
tions and complete analyses that were previously practically impossible. An
important consequence of this change is the ability to consider, compare, and
contrast different models that explain or predict data. As a result, vague scien-
tific hypotheses can be given more rigorous specifications in terms of statistical
models, which in turn provides precision in testing.
Our work here is an example of this alternative, model-centric approach
to study reproducibility. An experiment is performed in order to compare
models and scientific progress is made as old models are replaced by new
models. That is, whereas the hypothesis-centric approach typically assumes a
model structure and tests a hypothesis, in a model-centric approach the whole
model is considered and compared to other models. In this model-centric view,
hypotheses are subsumed under models such that a hypothesis represents a
specific statement about a model parameter.
In addition to being more general, a model-centric approach avoids cer-
tain challenges that a hypothesis-centric approach faces, in particular the un-
derdetermination of theory by data and holism (Quine, 1976). Theories or
hypotheses can never be tested in isolation because they come as a bundle
and with a group of background assumptions. For example, given evidence
that is inconsistent with some hypothesis, one option is to reject the hypoth-
esis and corresponding theory. Another option, however, is to place blame on
the measuring instruments, the experimental procedures, or some background
assumption. How does one decide which option to exercise? Scientists are gen-
erally adept at trouble-shooting issues and figuring out whether a particular
instrument is malfunctioning, for example. They do this by holding fixed one
set of assumptions (e.g., background theory and the reliability of the experi-
mental setup) and checking the reliability of others (e.g., whether a particular
measuring instrument is working as expected). And that is the point about
holism: there is always some network of assumptions being held fixed when
determining where to place the blame for negative results. Claiming to test a
hypothesis in isolation is pretending that there is no network of assumptions,
but there is, and consequently, a hypothesis cannot be tested in isolation.
The model-centric approach does a better job of making background as-
sumptions more explicit than the hypothesis-centric approach. Moreover, the
model-centric approach is better suited to capture the scientific practice of
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model comparison, an integral part of the open, collaborative practices that
have been proposed to solve issues surrounding reproducibility. Our analysis
underscores the importance of transmitting model-specific information for re-
producibility of results—a condition often readily satisfied in a model-centric
framework. We believe that a hypothesis-centric approach is too impoverished
to provide the necessary resources for a formal theory of such open practices.
Conclusion
We used our model-centric approach and formalization of reproducibility and
related concepts, to distinguish between reliability, auditability, replicability,
and reproducibility. The relationship among them is not as straightforward as
it may seem and a need for a nuanced understanding is warranted. For exam-
ple, a perfectly auditable experiment does not necessarily lead to reproducible
results, and an experiment that does not open its data does not necessar-
ily yield irreproducible results. Nevertheless, irreproducible results sometimes
raise suspicion and discussions typically turn towards concerns regarding the
transparency of research or validity of findings. These discussions, however, use
heuristic analogs of the concepts of reliability, auditability, replicability, and
reproducibility. Such heuristics might not hold and can lead to erroneous in-
ferences about research findings and researchers’ practices. Relatedly, we have
provided some details regarding which components need to be made open rel-
ative to some objective, and which don’t. For example, while necessary for
auditability of experiments, data sharing is not a prerequisite for reproducible
results, as suggested by NASEM, but other components of an experiment are.
On the other hand, reporting model details, such as modeling assumptions,
model structure, and parameters, becomes critical for improving reproducibil-
ity. Notably, even in recent recommendations for improving transparency in re-
porting via practices such as preregistration, models are typically left out while
transparency of hypotheses, methods, and study design are emphasized (Nosek
et al., 2018; van’t Veer and Giner-Sorolla, 2016).
Our framework is useful in improving the accuracy of judgments made
regarding replication and reproducibility. The literature on replication crisis
cites several putative causes of irreproducibility, including p-hacking, HARK-
ing, and publication bias. The social epistemology literature contributes other
underlying causes such as the rush to publish results due to perverse reward
structures within the publication system (Heesen, 2018). Our analysis shows
that neither elimination of questionable research practices nor correction of
scientific reward structures would necessarily lead to reproducible results, as
there are other impediments to reproducibility logically preceding lack of rigor
or transparency. For example, the rate of reproducibility is a parameter of the
system and therefore is a function of truth. Some level of irreproducibility will
always remain as a component of the system and we can only hope to attain a
level of reproducibility within the bounds of model misspecification and sam-
pling error. And even under the assumption of an ideal version of science that
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is free of methodological and cultural errors, employs reliable methods, and
does not operate under model misspecification, we might still not be able to
make a true discovery despite having improved the rate of reproducibility. We
are optimistic that our analysis improves the level of precision in discussions
surrounding the drivers of epistemic reproducibility.
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